KNOWLEDGE, THEORIZATION AND RIGHTS: RENEGOTIATING THE CONNECTIVES Edited by PIUS V THOMAS Published by Salesian College Publication Siliguri West Bengal SALESIAN COLLEGE P U B L I C A T I O N Don Bosco Road, Siliguri 734 001 / Post Box No. 73 principal@salesiancollege.net Phone:0353-2545622 Website: www.salesiancollege.in Published in West Bengal, INDIA The moral rights of the author have been asserted. All right reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Salesian College Publication. First Edition: 2015 Price: ? 600.00 ISBN 978-93-32216-12-4 Copyright © PIUS V THOMAS Heritage of the Yoga Philosophy and Transcendental Phenomenology: The Interlocution of Knowledge and Wisdom across Two Traditions of Philosophy Koshy Tharakan Today we possess all sorts of studies on Indian, Chinese, and other philosophies, studies that place these philosophies on the same level with Greek philosophy, considering them merely as different historical formulations of one and the same cultural idea. . . Before anything else, the attitude of these two kinds of "philosophers," the overall orientation of their interests, is thoroughly different... Only with the Greeks, however, do we find a universal ("cosmological") vital interest in the essentially new form of a purely "theoretical" attitude1. Benjamin Franklin reports the unique advantage of the dual vision that bifocals offered to him during his visit of France: I find [bifocals] more particularly convenient since my being in France, the glasses that serve me best at table to see what I eat not being the best to see the face of those on the other side of the table who speak to me; and when one's ears are not well accustomed to the sounds of a language, a sight of the move- ments in the features of him that speaks helps to explain; so that I understand French better by the help of my spectacles2. The advantage of comparative philosophy consists precisely in enabling a vision of the other tradition. Contrary to Hus- serl's claims that philosophy, as a pure "theoretical attitude", is uniquely European as according to him the theoretical atti- tude began only with the Greeks, in many systems of Indian philosophy we encounter similar theoretical attitude3. The discourse on 'self' and 'consciousness' is central to al- most all systems of Indian Philosophy as it is with the wont of any school of Western philosophy. Thus, for all classical schools of philosophy in India, except the "Càrvàka" materialist school, the ultimate goal of philosophizing is the attainment of "Moksa" (liberation of the self/ freedom of the self from ignorance-bondage ). The philosophy of Yoga as espoused by the sage Patanjali in his Yoga Sutra is foremost in delineating the path to liberation, which it construes as "Kaivalya"the state in which the individ- ual self abides in itself, without any fluctuations towards the world of everyday reality. Though different schools of Indian Philosophy emphasize different paths to the attainment of Mokja like Jhâna Mârga (path of knowledge), Bhakti Mârga (path of devotion) and Karma Mârga (path of action), underlying all these paths is Sâdhanâ - a "discipline" cultivated by intense reflection on self and consciousness. The best exemplification of Sâdhanâ is found in the Yoga philosophy of Patanjali. The paper argues that Sâdhanâ has striking similarity with and is the practical counterpart of the theoretical move aimed at "Re- duction" in Husserlian phenomenology. The term 'Yoga' has different connotation and its meaning differs in different kinds of Yoga (such as Raja Yoga, Hatha Yoga, Karma Yoga, and Bhakti Yoga). Semantically, the word 'Yoga' is a derivative of the Sanskrit verbal root 'Yuj', meaning 'to yoke' or 'to join' or 'to unite'. In its wider use, Yoga refers to the arithmetical operation of addition, planetary conjunction that brings certain consequences for the individual in astrolo- gy, and the syntactical formation of words in grammar. S. C. Banerji in his Studies in Origin and Development of Yoga men- tions the different meanings of Yoga such as 'skill in work', 'desireless action', 'acquisition of true knowledge', 'indifference to pleasure and pain', addition in arithmetic and conjunction in astronomy.4 Swami Prabhupada writes: "Yoga means the connecting link between the soul and the Supersoul, or the Supreme and the minute living creatures."5 Veda-Vyâsa has written a commentary on Yoga-Bhâsya to Patanjali's Yoga Sxitra and Vâcaspati-Misra has provided an explanation ('vivararia') of the Yoga-Bhàsya called Tattva-vaicârâdi. In this work, Vàcaspati -Misra points out that when Vyâsa defines Yoga provision- Heritage o f the Yoga Philosophy and Transcendental Phenomenology/73 ally as 'concentration' (Samàdhi), he uses the term Yoga in its etymological derivation from the stem 'Yuj-a' in the sense of 'concentration' and not 'conjunction'6. Thus, we may take the connotation of 'Yoga' in the philosophy of Patanjali as 'concen- tration' rather than 'union'. Such an understanding of Yoga as 'concentration' would lead us to recognize that 'Sâdhanâ' as underlying the Yogic practice is equivalent to the 'phenom- enological reduction' in the Husserlian phenomenology on a theoretical plane. According to Husserl, the way we tarry in the life-world is from a 'natural attitude', an attitude that takes for granted the existence of phenomena we encounter in our everyday experience. In order to attend to the way in which these phenomena get constituted in our experience, we need to enter into a 'phenomenological attitude' from the 'natural attitude'. For Husserl, phenomenological reduction is the gate- way to such an attitude. Much like sâdhanâ, phenomenological reduction too is a practice that needs to be cultivated in order to move out of the 'default' attitude -the natural attitude-to enter into the phenomenological attitude. Patanjali in Yoga Sütra, First Book (Samàdhi Pâda) second Sütra states the distinguishing characteristic of Yoga as "the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff". Later in Sütra I. 12 it is stated that the means of restriction of the fluctuations consist in'Practice' ('abhyàsa') and'Passionlessness' ('vairâgya'). Vairâgya arrests the flow of mind-stuff towards objects whereas the practice of 'discriminatory knowledge' opens up ' Viveka' or 'discrimination'. Only when these two are practiced together will the restriction be achieved. Practice that is 'abhyàsa' is an effort (prayatna) with the goal of attaining permanence in the restricted state. Such 'discriminatory-practice', that is abhyàsa coupled with vairàgya finally leads to "Kaivalya" (Yoga Sütra I. 16) wherein the "Self abides in himself" (Yoga Sütra I. 3). The 'discriminatory-practice' ('Sâdhanâ') of Yoga may be read in terms of Husserl's concept of 'Phenomenological Reduction' as enabling the transition from the 'natural attitude' to the phenomenological attitude - or in the case of Yoga as enabling to attain the state where the "Self abides in himself". 74/KNOWLEDGE, THEORIZATION AND RIGHTS According to Husserl all sciences except phenomenology remain in the natural attitude. Their aim is to cognize the world comprehensively and reliably as it confronts us, from the natural standpoint. The greatest impediment to cognition is that, in nat- ural standpoint, the style of research will always be one-sided, as they take for granted the objects or phenomena that appear in our experience. The phenomenological attitude on the other hand, sets aside all such prevailing habits of thinking. It helps us to develop a method the method of reduction by which we are able to 'transcendentally purify' the phenomena, that opens the proper direction of regard to every cognition. The general positing, the characteristic of natural attitude, is a consciousness of the object as actually existing. This natural attitude is not an accidental or particular act; rather it is a continuous attitude throughout the natural life. One might characterize it as the de- fault attitude. The reduction opens up a true ontological realm of pure or absolute consciousness. Thus, from its epistemological starting point Phenomenology reaches to an ontological realm.7 The reduction operates at two levels, the objective sphere as well as the consciousness-sphere, simultaneously. Both the object posited and the act of positing is subjected to reduction. Thus, by phenomenological reduction (epoché/ bracketing) the object is bracketed and the act is put out of action.8 The whole world and its objects posited in the natural attitude cease to be valid for us. Then, phenomenological reduction is the operation nec- essary to make pure consciousness and subsequently the whole phenomenological region, accessible to us. The term 'reduction' characterizes the turn towards transcendental phenomenology. It provides the conditions of the possibility of the empirical knowledge of being as well as the sense of being itself. Husserl talks about three stages of reductions. The first reduction or 'phenomenological reduction' effectuates the ex- clusion of the natural world and the corresponding sciences. Thus, the first reduction is the gateway to the phenomenological regard or attitude. Thus, the turn towards the phenomeno- logical attitude is called the phenomenological reduction. The Heritage of the Yoga Philosophy and Transcendental Phenomenology / 75 'eidetic reduction' deals with material and formal essences that are transcendent. In it, all references to the particulars are withheld and the essences are brought to light. In an eidetic enquiry, the greatest handicap is that one is tempted to "psy- chologize the eidetic" and thereby ends up in Idealism. In other words, idealism is a result of the confusion of essences with the resulting consciousness of the essences. Thus, eidetic reduction vindicates the eidetic as eidetic. Husserl makes a distinction between the essence of something 'immanent' and essence of something 'transcendent'. That is between "essences of formations belonging to consciousness itself" and "essences of individual affairs transcendent to consciousness." The lat- ter is constituted in the consciousness by virtue of sensuous appearances. Now, Husserl reminds us that the eidetic reduc- tion is confined to the eidetic of the transcendent.9 The eidetic science, however, remains a positive science as it restrains the validity of the natural apperception of the world. When we inactivate this by means of transcendental reduction we enter the realm of the transcendental phenomenology.10 The third reduction is transcendental reduction. It brackets all references to the transcendent as the intentional correlation of our acts. Thus the world becomes a world-phenomenon. This universal epoché transforms our attitude in the 'life-world'. Through this reduction we discover the correlation between the world and world-consciousness. Transcendental reduction liberates one from the internal bond of the pre-givenness of the world to a realm of absolutely self-enclosed and absolutely self-sufficient domain of consciousness. It reveals the transcendental subjec- tivity, which validates the world. The method of reduction in phenomenology should not be confused with Cartesian method of doubt. Cartesian doubt is an abstention from an existential belief in order to attain cer- tainty of knowledge. Phenomenological reduction or epoché, on the other hand is the disclosure of a belief as a belief. The one who practises epoché is already detached in principle from the belief. The epoché then is a means to reinforce and confirm this 76 / KNOWLEDGE, THEORIZATION AND RIGHTS detachment. Thus the epoché is a peculiar mode of conscious- ness and contrary to Cartesian doubt, does not present itself as a negated belief. As an act, it offers itself for noetic analysis, thereby uncovering the hidden intentional acts. However, its noematic correlate is the experience of the belief in the world. Hence the epoché does not negate the existence of the world, but retains it intentionally. As Stroker points out: This correlative structure of the reduced noema must be tak- en into consideration when one inquiries into the sense and achievement of the universal epoché. If one overlooks this, one runs the danger of misinterpreting the epoché in such a way that one thinks of the phenomenological on-looker, who utilizes the epoché, as being exclusively turned to the subjective contents of experience and no longer interested in the being of the world at all. But the epoché is not meant to lead me to the stream o f my act-life because I want to take my leave of the world, as if it were something that could be separated from this stream; rather it leads me to this stream because the world, and all being, is contained in it intentionally.11 Thus transcendental reduction shows that all questions pertain- ing to being can only be raised within transcendental subjectiv- ity. It is in transcendental subjectivity that the justification of being is carried out. What the transcendental reduction offers us is the realm of absolute consciousness or transcendental sub- jectivity. Pure consciousness is the phenomenological residuum and is the theme for its investigations. Husserl reiterates that with 'reduction', " . . . we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, "constitutes" within itself, all worldly transcendencies" } 2 With the transcendental reduction, human beings as persons in association with fellow human beings living in a society are excluded as what remains after the reduction is the pure sub- jectivity-the transcendental ego. The pure subjectivity or ego is something necessarily present in all cogitations; nevertheless, Heritage of the Yoga Philosophy and Transcendental Phenomenology / 77 it is not a part or moment inherent in the mental processes themselves13. The pure or transcendental ego is transcendence within immanence. It is the primal region of all being. All other regions of being are rooted in and essentially relative to the region of transcendental (pure) consciousness. The phenom- enological reduction makes a radical ontological distinction: being as consciousness and being as something which becomes "manifested" in consciousness. The phenomenological method operates in the acts of reflec- tion. Reflection is the ego's living in its mental processes. In other words, it is " . . . the name of the method of consciousness leading to the cognition of any consciousness whatever."14 In phenomenology, reflection itself becomes an object of study as by reflection, we also mean a group of mental processes that are essentially united. Such a reflective analysis reveals the intentional structure of consciousness. Intentionality is the essential peculiarity of consciousness. "Intentionality is what characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense and which, at the same time, justifies designating the whole stream of men- tal processes as the stream of consciousness and as the unity of one consciousness."15 Intentionality is the directedness of consciousness. According to Husserl, consciousness, in almost all instances, is always directed to some object. In other words, consciousness is consciousness of something. The phenom- enological analysis of consciousness reveals the noesis-noema structure of experience. Noesis is the objectifying act and noema is the intended object. Noesis and noema correspond to the subject and object poles of experience respectively. Every noesis has its corresponding noema. However, the same object can be apprehended differently. That is to say that the many intended objects may refer to the same object grasped in varying intending acts. This implies that there is an underlying unity or identity of different 'noemata' of varying acts. Without this unity we cannot support any claim to objectivity. If we maintain the right attitude and obey the clear eidetic data without any prejudice, the same insight can be had for everyone. 78 / KNOWLEDGE, THEORIZATION AND RIGHTS Heritage of the Yoga Philosophy and Transcendental Phenomenology / 79 Thus, Husserl says: . . . firm results are directly produced, and the same thing oc- curs for everyone having the same attitude; there accrue firm possibilities of communicating to others what one has himself seen, of testing descriptions, of making salient the unnoticed intrusions of empty verbal meanings, of making known and weeding out errors by measuring them again against intuition.16 From the above discussion, we see that the phenomeno- logical reduction that Husserl performed was free from any preconceived notions about the reality of the world and was aimed at opening up the domain of pure consciousness by a cultivated mode of reflection. In a similar tone, Patanjali states: "the knowledge of the Self arises as the result of constraint upon that which exists for its own sake" (Yoga Sütra III. 35). Constraint or 'Samyama' is a technical term in yoga referring to 'dhâranà' (concentration), 'dhyâna' (meditation), and 'samàdhi' (the final stage of meditation where the meditating consciousness loses its own form). Again, in Yoga Sütra IV.22 it is mentioned that "the intellect (citi) which unites not [with objects] is conscious of its own thinking-substance when the [mind-stuff] takes the form of that [thinking substance by reflecting it]." In Yoga Sütra, the Second and the Third books, namely Sâdhanâ Pàda and Vibhûti Pàda explain the five external or in- direct aids to yoga and the three direct or internal aids to yoga. Thus, we have been told that an aspirant for yogic knowledge must prepare himself/herself by these external aids, which include Yama, Niyama, Àsana, Prânâyâma, and Prathyâhâra in order to embark upon the practices of Dhâranà, Dhyâna and Samàdhi. Yama and Niyama preclude uncontrolled desires and emotions, whereas Asana and Prânâyâma eliminate disturbances arising from the physical body. The function of Pratyâhâra is the withdrawal of sense organs from the mind thus cutting it off from the external world and the sense impressions it pro- duces on the mind. Puligandla identifies this preparatory stage (.Pratyâhâra) as the yogic counter part of the phenomenological reduction17. However, we argue that it is not just 'Pratyâhàra', but the entire 'Sâdhanâ'the 'discriminatory practice' that should be construed as similar to the phenomenological re- duction. In Husserlian phenomenology, 'phenomenological reduction' refers not only to the withdrawal of senses that cuts off the mind from the world, but to enter a new way of looking at the world in which objectivity is seen as constituted in the subjectivity itself. This phenomenological seeing is attained through a disciplined reflection on consciousness which is like the 'discriminatory-practice' of yoga. Nevertheless, as Sinari has pointed out the crucial difference between phenomeno- logical reduction and yogic meditation consists in the fact that phenomenological transcendental reduction does not amount to total annulment of the reflective activity of consciousness, whereas the Yogic meditation precisely aims at such a state of transcendental subjectivity, where the subjectivity releases itself into a state beyond the conscious activity- the highest state of " Samâdhi."18 This is so, because unlike Husserlian phenome- nology, the Yoga philosophy does not construe 'intentionality ' -the directedness of consciousness or the 'aboutness' of consciousness as an intrinsic feature of consciousness. In contrast to the Husserlian understanding of "theory" as "pure knowledge", Gadamer offers a different account. According to Gadamer, 'theoria' in the sense of a detached the- oretical approach based on a reflective consciousness is a later development. The primordial meaning of theoria in the Greek thought is to participate in an event - a sharing that emphasizes being present. As Gadamer notes, the earlier meaning of theoria has to do with taking part in a delegation to a festival meant to honour the gods.19 Strikingly, this original Greek concept of 'theoria' as a "social practice" resonates with the Yoga notion of 'sâdhanâ'the 'discriminatory practice', albeit sans the "social" dimension of practice as the emphasis of Yoga philosophy is not so much on the social dimension of the practice of sâdhanâ. 80 / KNOWLEDGE, THEORIZATION AND RIGHTS Our reading of phenomenological reduction in the light of yogic sâdhanâ helps us to recognize firstly how despite Husserl's own avowed claim that philosophy is distinctively a Western intellectual achievement, his own philosophy has striking par- allels in the Eastern philosophical thought. Secondly, sâdhanâ as a "theoretical practice" understood in the context of Gadamer 's retrieval of the original sense of 'theoria' as a "social practice" helps us to reinstate the cultural heritage and wisdom embedded in local and regional identities marginalized by Globalization even while appreciating the shared commonal- ities between two traditions of philosophy. Perhaps, such an understanding of Indian philosophy was not available during Husserl's time-it required a gradual but continuous seeping of traditions and tendencies in our milieu of globalization of ideas to reject such 'Eurocentric' notions of philosophy as it had to await the availability of "cultural bifocals" or "fusion of horizons" in the Gadamerian sense. Endnotes and References 1 Husserl E. "Philosophy and the crisis of European man". Lauer Q (ed). Phenomenology and the crisis of philosophy. Harper and Row, New York, 1965.149-192. 2 Van Doren C. Benjamin Franklin. New York: Penguin, 1968. 637. 3 Husserl E. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book. (Trans: Kersten F) Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982. According to Husserl, "theoretical" attitude is one which pursues "knowledge for its own sake". 4 Sarukkai S. "Inside/outside: Merleau-Ponty/yoga". Philos East West 52 (4). 2002. 459-478. Sarukkai in his article offers a phe- nomenological understanding of yoga from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body. 5 Prabhupada BS. "Krçna consciousness: the topmost yoga system". The Bhaktivedanta Book Trust. Mumbai, 1972.17. 6 Woods JH. The yoga system of Patanjali. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass , 1914. 5. Heritage o f the Yoga Philosophy and Transcendental Phenomenology / 81 7 Levinas E. The theory of intuition in Husserl's phenomenology. Trans. Orianne A. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973. Xiii. 8 Husserl E. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book. (Trans: Kersten F) Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982. 60-61. 9 Ibid. 139-142. 10 Kockelmans JJ. "Phenomenologico-psychological and transcenden- tal reductions in Husserl's 'crisis', Tymieniecka AT (ed) The later Husserl and the idea of phenomenology". Analecta Husserliana, vol.2. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1972. 78-89. 11 Stroker E. "Husserlian foundations of science". The Center for Ad- vanced Research in Phenomenology. Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1987. 75. 12 Husserl E. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book. (Trans: Kersten F) Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982.113. 13 Ibid. 132. 14 Ibid. 177. 15 Ibid. 199. 16 Ibid. 212. 17 Puligandla R. "Phenomenological reduction and yogic medita- tion". Philos East West 20 (1). 1970.19-33. 18 Sinari R. "The method of phenomenological reduction and yoga". Philos East West 15 (3-4). 1965. 217-228. 19 Scheibler I. Gadamer: between Heidegger and Habermas. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2000. 76-77. 82 / KNOWLEDGE, THEORIZATION AND RIGHTS